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Circuit Rift Sends Sound Waves
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT’S
SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR DIGITAL SAMPLING
OF SOUND RECORDINGS

INTRODUCTION
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit aptly pointed out in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films,1 “there is no Rosetta stone for the interpretation of the
copyright2 statute.”3 A lawyer may need a Rosetta stone to
interpret a musical arrangement, however, one needs no such
key to decrypt the Copyright Act of 1976.4 Despite the ongoing
debate over whether the Copyright Act allows a de minimis5
exception to apply to the unauthorized use of copyrighted
sound recordings, interpreting the Act may be simpler than it
seems.6 A court or practitioner need not look past the plain
meaning of the statute to determine that it allows for such an
exception, and a more comprehensive statutory interpretation
confirms this conclusion—a conclusion which a majority of
authorities have favored.7 Courts, professionals in the music
industry, and scholars have, nonetheless, disagreed on the
interpretation of the Copyright Act.8 In the summer of 2016,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
formalized the divide by creating a circuit split, in VMG
Salsoul LLC v. Ciccone, in which it departed from the Sixth
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
The term copyright refers to the “bundle of rights” that involve the
underlying “right to copy,” and each right can be copyrighted, “sold, assigned, leased,
and/or licensed separately.” RICHARD SCHULENBERG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC
INDUSTRY: AN INSIDER’S VIEW 493 (2005) (emphasis in original).
3 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805.
4 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)).
5 “De minimis” is a Latin phrase that means “trifling” or “negligible.” De
minimis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
6 See infra Part II.
7 See infra Section II.B.
8 See infra Sections II.A.3–4, B.3–4.
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Circuit’s reasoning in Bridgeport by recognizing a de minimis
exception in the Act.9 If this rift remains unresolved, it will
continue to send a wave of uneasiness across the music industry
that will chill the art of music sampling and drown out the
revived sounds of songs past.
On June 2, 2016, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that it
was creating a circuit split in its 2–1 decision in VMG Salsoul.10
There, the court found that Madonna’s11 use of a .23 secondlong sample of a single horn hit from the 1983 song, “Love
Break,”12 in her 1990 recording of “Vogue,”13 did not violate
copyright laws.14 The court came to its decision by applying the
de minimis exception, finding that a general audience would
not be able to identify the sample as a recording from “Love
Break.”15 The Ninth Circuit found that Section 114(b)16 of the
Copyright Act does not eliminate the use of the de minimis
exception in infringement claims involving sound recordings.17
By doing so, the Ninth Circuit thus departed from the Sixth
Circuit’s 2005 decision in Bridgeport,18 in which the Sixth
Circuit categorically eliminated the de minimis exception as a
defense for any unauthorized digital sampling.19
Many have argued that rather than the courts decoding
the existing language of the Act, Congress should change the
Act’s language.20 In light of the split, however, this note argues
that instead of waiting for a legislative change—which could
result in further confusion or, if Congress explicitly eliminates
a de minimis exception, a chilling effect on an important

See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 874, 886.
11 Madonna, MADONNA, http://www.madonna.com/ [https://perma.cc/WSU8QWVH]. Commonly known only by her first name, Madonna’s full name is Madonna
Louis Ciccone. See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 874.
12 SALSOUL ORCHESTRA, OOH, I LOVE IT (LOVE BREAK) (SalSoul Records 1983).
13 MADONNA, VOGUE (Sire Records 1990).
14 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 874.
15 See id. at 880.
16 Section 114(b) addresses the scope of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights.
17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012).
17 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 874, 883–84.
18 See id. at 886–87 (declining to follow the Sixth Circuit). The dissent argued
that the court should adhere to the Sixth Circuit’s “bright-line rule” that the use of a
copyrighted sound recording without a license is infringement. See id. at 888–90
(Silverman, J., dissenting).
19 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–05 (6th
Cir. 2005). The phrase “digital sampling” can be used interchangeably with the phrase
“music sampling” or “sound sampling.” See id. This note will use the phrase “digital
sampling” in conjunction with the phrase “sound recording.”
20 See infra Part IV.
9
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artistic practice21—the Supreme Court should interpret the
language of the Copyright Act to allow for a de minimis
exception in the use of copyrighted sound recordings.22 A
Supreme Court ruling on the issue would clearly resolve the
circuit split and would do so more easily and quickly than a
congressional change to the Act.
Part I of the note contains an overview of digital
sampling, including a discussion of the history of the Copyright
Act and an explanation of the de minimis exception and related
tests in copyright infringement cases involving sound
recordings. Part II details the circuit split created by the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport and the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in VMG Salsoul, including the courts’ and their supporters’
interpretations of the Copyright Act. Part III explains the
impact of the circuit split, followed by Part IV, which evaluates
possible solutions to the split and ultimately recommends that
the Supreme Court interpret the present Copyright Act to
allow for a de minimis exception to sampling. Next, Part V
provides a statutory interpretation approach to determine that
the Copyright Act does indeed include a de minimis exception
for the use of copyrighted sound recordings and that the
Supreme Court should reach this conclusion in light of the
circuit split.
I.

“U CAN’T TOUCH THIS”23: BACKGROUND ON COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION AND SAMPLING OF SOUND RECORDINGS

While digital sampling of sound recordings was not a
practice that existed at the time of the country’s founding,24
what did exist was the belief that the arts were useful and that
creative works should be protected.25 This Section first provides
a brief history of copyright protection in the United States and
how it evolved to apply to sound recordings. Next, this Section
21 See, e.g., KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE
LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 19 (2011) (explaining how digital sampling
has been particularly instrumental in the development of hip-hop music).
22 This note focuses on the de minimis doctrine and the doctrine of
substantiality generally and does not seek to provide a recommendation for which
specific test of substantiality courts should use. See infra Section I.C.
23 MC HAMMER, U Can’t Touch This, on PLEASE HAMMER DON’T HURT ‘EM
(Capitol Records 1990). The names of songs that have sampled or have been sampled
are included in the heading of each major part of this note.
24 See John Schietinger, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the
Sixth Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 211
(2005) (citing Molly McGraw, Sound Sampling Protection and Infringement in Today’s
Music Industry, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 147, 149 (1989)).
25 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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provides an overview of what digital sampling of sound
recordings is, followed by an explanation of the de minimis
exception and the legal tests applied to claims of copyright
infringement of sound recordings.
A.

Copyright Protection of Sound Recordings

The founders of the United States of America recognized
the importance of protecting creations by including the
Copyright Clause in the U.S. Constitution.26 It reads: “The
Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries.”27 The First Congress exercised such power,
and on May 31, 1790, President George Washington signed the
nation’s first copyright law, which granted “authors of ‘maps,
charts, and books’ the exclusive right to ‘print, reprint, publish
or vend’ their works for . . . up to twenty-eight years.”28 Since
then, “[w]hatever the vehicle for change,” copyright law looks very
different than it did when Congress passed the original Copyright
Act.29 What has not changed, however, is that copyright laws are
formulated to balance the interest in protecting original works
with the interest against stifling creativity,30 thereby furthering
the purpose of the Copyright Clause.31
One major change to the copyright laws came in 1831,
when Congress deemed music a “useful art” within the
meaning of the Constitution’s Copyright Clause32 and finally
included music as a type of work “eligible for federal

See id.
Id.
28 See EDWARD B. SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 14–15,
31 (1st ed. 2000) (asterisk omitted) (quoting Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat.
124); see also David S. Blessing, Who Speaks Latin Anymore?: Translating De Minimis
Use for Application to Copyright Infringement and Sampling, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2399, 2405 (2004) (citing Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124).
29 SAMUELS, supra note 28, at 5.
30 See Blessing, supra note 28, at 2406.
31 In 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court summarized copyright’s purpose as follows:
26
27

Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is,
by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.
SCHULENBERG, supra note 2, at 494 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
32 SCHULENBERG, supra note 2, at 494 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8);
see Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436.
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copyright.”33 Over a hundred years and many technological
advances later, Congress revised the Copyright Act in 1971 by
adding copyright protection for sound recordings through the
Sound Recording Amendment.34 It was not until this
amendment that sound recordings were protected by a separate
copyright.35 Since 1972, most “records, tapes, and CDs” have
involved two separate copyrights: (1) the copyright in the music
itself (i.e., the written composition), which “belongs to the
composer and extends to the making, distribution or performance
of the song,” and (2) the copyright in the sound recording, which
“belongs to the record company . . . and extends only to the
making or distribution of that particular recording of the song.”36
The Copyright Act underwent several more revisions, the most
recent of which was in 1976.37 The premise of the Copyright Act of
1976 is that there is a distinction between a work and its
copyright,38 and sound recordings and their corresponding
musical compositions continue to be treated as separate works
with their own copyrights.39
The Copyright Act of 1976 further expands the scope of
protection for music,40 but limits the scope of copyright for

SAMUELS, supra note 28, at 31; see Copyright Act of 1831 § 1.
See Schietinger, supra note 24, at 216 (citing Sound Recording Amendment
of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–140, 85 Stat. 391). The amendment was Congress’s response to
record and tape piracy, which “reached epidemic proportions in the 1960s and 1970s,”
and it was “effective for records made after February 15, 1972.” SAMUELS, supra note
28, at 45.
35 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800 (“Although musical compositions have
always enjoyed copyright protection, it was not until 1971 that sound recordings were
subject to a separate copyright.”).
36 SAMUELS, supra note 28, at 45; See Caitlin Kowalke, Survey Says: “Blurred
Line” Call for Reliable Aid in the Adjudication of Composition Infringement Actions, 32
ENT. & SPORTS LAW 24, 24 (2016). The Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport noted that “[t]he
analysis that is appropriate for determining infringement of a musical composition
copyright, is not the analysis that is to be applied to determine infringement of a sound
recording.” Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 798. This note deals with copyright infringement of
sound recordings, not musical compositions.
37 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)); See SAMUELS, supra note 28, at 55 (Although
the last major revision of the act was in 1976, “Congress clarified and cautiously
extended copyrights in separate amendments in 1984, 1992, 1995, and 1998.”); see also
Blessing, supra note 28, at 2405 n.48.
38 See LYMAN R. PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF
COPYRIGHT 92–93 (1991) (The 1976 Act’s premise “is that its subject matter is the
copyright of a work, not the work itself. . . . In theory [the distinction between a work
and its copyright] has been true of all American copyright statutes since the 1790 act,
and indeed the premise is mandated by the copyright clause.”).
39 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7) (2012).
40 See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 38, at 93 (“The narrow scope of
copyright in previous statutes,” meant the Act’s premise was utilized but
unarticulated, “and beyond the narrow scope of copyright the statutes themselves
provided little internal evidence of it.” The 1976 Act, however, “so enlarged the scope of
33

34
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sound recordings.41 Section 114 of the Copyright Act of 1976
details the “[s]cope of exclusive rights in sound recordings,”42
and subsection (b) provides in relevant part that under the first
clause of Section 106, a copyright owner’s exclusive right in a
sound recording “is limited to the right to duplicate the sound
recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or
indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording.”43
Section 114(b) also provides that, under Section 106,44 a
copyright owner’s exclusive rights in a sound recording “do not
extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording
that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other
sounds, even though sounds imitate or simulate those in the
copyrighted sound recording.”45 This subsection of Section 114
of the Copyright Act is the focus of this note, which will provide
a statutory interpretation of this subsection and other relevant
sections in Part V.46
B.

Sampling of Sound Recordings

The Copyright Act defines a sound recording as
“result[ing] from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or
other sounds.”47 “Sampling” of sound recordings has been
defined as “the actual physical copying of sounds from an
existing recording for use in a new recording, even if
accomplished with slight modifications such as changes to pitch
or tempo.”48 In other words, the “the sound recording itself” is
being sampled.49 For example, MC Hammer pulled a sound
recording from Rick James’s song, “Super Freak,” and used
that exact recording in his song, “U Can’t Touch This.”50 Artists
have been employing this practice through the use of a
copyright that the importance of the premise comes to the forefront, and evidence of the
premise is abundant.”).
41 See 2 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 14:46.3.
42 Copyright Act of 1976 § 114.
43 Id. at § 114(b).
44 Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides for “[e]xclusive rights in
copyrighted works,” and pursuant to its first two clauses, copyright owners have the
exclusive right to “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords” and “to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” Id. at § 106.
45 Id. at § 114(b).
46 See infra Part V.
47 Copyright Act of 1976 § 101.
48 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002)).
49 MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 77.
50 See Pat Pemberton, U Can’t Touch This, ROLLING STONE (June 14, 2012),
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/u-can-t-touch-this-mc-hammer [https://perma.cc/
NH7B-P6HQ].

2017]

CIRCUIT RIFT SENDS SOUND WAVES

411

technological device known as a “sampler” since the 1960s
when the technology was first developing.51
Since “the underlying notes, chords, melody and rhythm
of the song” are inseparable aspects of the sample, sampling
implicates both the musical composition copyright and the
sound recording copyright.52 If sampling would “violate one or
both copyrights in a song, then the sampler must obtain
permission or a license from the owner(s) of each copyright
infringed.”53 The licensing process can be “cost-prohibitive,”
causing artists to either “forgo sampling” or sample and risk
being sued for copyright infringement.54
C.

Copyright Infringement of Sound Recordings

To prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) the plaintiff owns a valid copyright in the work; and
(2) the defendant exercised a copyright holder’s exclusive right
without authorization.55 The latter requires the plaintiff to also
show: (i) the defendant “engaged in copying in fact,”56 and (ii)
there is “substantial similarity . . . between the copyrighted
work and the allegedly infringing work.”57 The second subpoint
is most relevant to this note’s discussion. The substantial
similarity requirement suggests that to constitute copyright
infringement of a sound recording, the copying must be greater
than de minimis58—”[t]he de minimis analysis is therefore a
derivation of substantial similarity.”59
There are various methods for determining whether
there is substantial similarity.60 These methods include a
Schietinger, supra note 24.
MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 77.
53 Id. at 78. This note will not discuss the licensing process in depth.
54 John S. Pelletier, Sampling the Circuits: The Case for a New Comprehensive
Scheme for Determining Copyright Infringement as a Result of Music Sampling, 89 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1161, 1172 (2012); see infra Part III.
55 MCLEOD & DICOLA supra note 21, at 129, 136 n.29.
56 Id. at 129. Copying in fact is typically easy to prove and is not a major
issue in these types of infringement disputes since “a sample is a literal copy of a sound
recording.” Id. The sample is typically easy to recognize, and when it is not, forensic
technologies can make it easier to identify when a sample has been used. See id.
57 Id.; see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03 (2013).
58 See Blessing, supra note 28, at 2408 (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER § 8.01(G) (2000)).
59 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 841
(M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am.
Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (1983)).
60 See Mark J. Carter, Applying the Fragmented Literal Similarity Test to
Musical-Work and Sound-Recording Infringement: Correcting the Bridgeport Music,
Inc. v. Dimension Films Legacy, 14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 669, 677 (2013).
51

52
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fragmented literal similarity test and a quantitative and
qualitative de minimis analysis.61 The phrase “fragmented
literal similarity” is reflective of “the exactness of the
similarity” between the part of the recording that is sampled
and the sampled copy.62 It is “based on literal elements”
contained throughout an allegedly infringing work,63 but also
recognizes that works that contain samples can be very
different from the sources of the samples.64 To determine at
what point fragmented similarity becomes substantial enough
to render sampling an infringement, courts look at the
plaintiff’s, or sampled artist’s, work.65 If the work of the artist
who sampled the plaintiff’s work is “large enough
quantitatively or important enough qualitatively,” then
substantial similarity exists.66 When the portion that was
sampled is small, however, some courts conclude that the
sample is de minimis, and as such, too small for copyright
protection.67 There are no bright-line rules regarding this
quantitative consideration because “the qualitative dimension
can always trump,” even if the sample is quantitatively small.68
Thus, a fragmented literal similarity test can be used to
determine whether a sample is de minimis.69
61 See id. A third test is the “[c]omprehensive [n]onliteral [s]imilarity” test,
but this is not relevant because it looks for “the fundamental essence” of a work being
duplicated in another, and a sound recording sample is essentially an exact copy.
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, at § 13.03[A][1]. Courts have employed other tests,
“including the ordinary-lay-observer test,” “the average-lay-observer test,” and “the
total concept and feel” test. Carter, supra note 60, at 677. These tests will not be
examined in this note.
62 MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 130 (emphasis omitted).
63 See Carter, supra note 60, at 678.
64 MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 130.
65 Id.
66 Id. (internal citations omitted).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See id. Even if the plaintiff establishes that the defendant engaged in
copying in fact and one of the methods indicates there was substantial similarity
between the plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s allegedly infringing work, the
defendant can sometimes successfully assert the affirmative defense of “fair use.” See
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, at § 13.03[A][2][a]. In other words, if a sample does
not fall below the de minimis threshold, a defendant may still succeed on a fair use
defense. See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 145. Courts use a four-factor
balancing test codified in the Copyright Act to evaluate a defendant’s fair use defense.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). The sampler being sued has the burden to establish the fair
use defense. See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 130. Courts sometimes conflate
the de minimis and fair use doctrines. See Carter, supra note 60, at 679. Jane
Ginsburg, a Columbia law professor, explained that “fair use is moot when a sample
falls below the de minimis threshold.” MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 145. If
there is “too little” in the sample, then you do not get to fair use. Id. Fair use is
different from the lack of substantiality and de minimis use defenses because if a
sample is fair use, “the sampled portion of the work is still deemed to be protected by
copyright” whereas success of the lack of substantiality and de minimis use defenses

2017]

CIRCUIT RIFT SENDS SOUND WAVES

413

A defendant can use the de minimis defense to assert
that the sample is so small (i.e., de minimis) that there is a
lack of substantial similarity.70 The legal maxim, de minimis
non curatlex, can be translated to “the law does not concern
itself with trifles.”71 The de minimis exception is a fundamental
principle of common law—not just in the area of copyright.72 A
major rationale for the exception is that it helps “to avoid the
administrative costs of lawsuits when takings are small.”73 In
the copyright realm, the de minimis exception permits literal
copying of small and insignificant portions of the plaintiff’s
work.74 Successfully asserting the de minimis exception means
that the copying was so trivial that it falls “below the
quantitative threshold of substantial similarity.”75 The de
minimis analysis requires a quantitative and qualitative
examination of the work.76 The trial court in Bridgeport noted,
however, the “lack of clear road maps for de minimis analyses
from the circuit courts or the Supreme Court.”77 The Ninth
Circuit in Newton v. Diamond, however, found that “a use is de
minimis only if the average audience would not recognize the
appropriation.”78 Whether the de minimis defense—or
exception—can be used in cases alleging infringement of a
sound recording copyright is the focus of this note.79

indicate that “copyright does not protect the portions of the sampled tracks at issue.”
Id. at 146.
70 See Carter, supra note 60, at 679.
71 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 877 (citation omitted).
72 Professor Daniel J. Gervais of Vanderbilt University Law School explained
that, “The de minimis doctrine is not a copyright doctrine, but a rule from Roman law. It
is essentially a worldwide rule, applicable anywhere in Europe and in most legal systems
[he] can think of.” Steven Seidenberg, US Perspectives: US Courts Split on Legality of
Music Sampling, INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH (June 28, 2016), http://www.ip-watch.org/
2016/06/28/us-courts-split-on-legality-of-music-sampling/ [https://perma.cc/9QV9-B2SQ].
73 MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 141.
74 RAYMOND J. DOWD, COPYRIGHT LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 13:30 (2d ed.
2016) (internal citations omitted).
75 Id.
76 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830,
841 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (citing Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D.
Cal. 2002)), rev’d, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
77 Id. at 840.
78 Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Fisher v.
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986), amended and superseded by 388 F.3d 1189
(9th Cir. 2004) (finding that a de minimis exception applied to the unauthorized use of
a copyrighted musical composition)).
79 The Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport did not explicitly discuss fair use. See
MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 146.
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“SOS”80: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Even prior to the Ninth Circuit creating the circuit split,
the Sixth Circuit’s Bridgeport decision faced criticism, and
there was a divide in the legal field and in the music industry
as to whether the court properly ruled that there was no de
minimis exception for the unauthorized use of copyrighted
sound recordings.81 Prior to Bridgeport, the law on sampling
was “murky,” and although using a portion of a copyrighted
song perked up peoples’ ears, using a very small portion could
be defended as de minimis.82 While district courts had ruled on
the de minimis exception, there was a dearth of appellate
decisions, which left artists without guidance on the matter.83
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport in 2005 was the first
appellate decision on the issue.84
As the Sixth Circuit pointed out in Bridgeport, “sound
recording copyright holders[,] . . . studio musicians and their
labor organization[s]” favor the interpretation that the
unauthorized taking of a sample of a copyrighted sound
recording is infringement, regardless of the size of the sample.85
On the other hand, many hip hop artists view this
interpretation as “stifling creativity.”86 Despite this distinction,
“today’s sampler is tomorrow’s samplee,” and artists could
easily change their tune depending on whether they are a
sampler or a samplee.87 In 2016, the Ninth Circuit departed
from the Sixth Circuit and ruled in favor of today’s sampler,
thereby creating a circuit split.88
The following two Sections detail the circuits’ stances on
the de minimis exception in Bridgeport and VMG Salsoul.
These Sections recount the impugned sample, the procedural
history, each court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act, and
the holding for both cases, respectively.89 Each case description
concludes with an overview of the authorities that support the
interpretation set forth in each case, noting whether those

RIHANNA, SOS (Def Jam Recordings 2006).
See Bill Donahue, 9th Circ. Down the Gauntlet on Music Sampling, LAW
360 (June 4, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/803236/9th-circ-throws-down-thegauntlet-on-music-sampling [https://perma.cc/LWL3-4NHC].
82 Id.
83 Id.; see infra note 117.
84 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005).
85 Id. at 801–04.
86 Id. 803–04.
87 Id. at 804.
88 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016).
89 See infra Sections II.A–B.
80

81
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authorities supported the position before or after the respective
case was decided.90
A.

Sixth Circuit Stifles Creativity in Bridgeport Music v.
Dimension Films
1. The Sample

The sample in question in Bridgeport was merely a twosecond guitar riff from George Clinton Jr. and the Funkadelic’s
song “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” (Jam).91 This two-second
sample from the song was copied, or “looped,”92 and extended
for sixteen beats in the song “100 Miles and Runnin’” (100
Miles), which was used in the sound track of the film, I Got the
Hookup.93 The sample appears in five places in “100 Miles” with
“each looped segment last[ing] approximately 7 seconds.”94
2. The Procedural History
In 2001, Plaintiffs Bridgeport Music, Inc., Westbound
Records, Inc., Southfield Music, Inc., and Nine Records, Inc.
brought an action alleging nearly 500 counts of copyright
infringement along with state law claims regarding the
unauthorized use of samples in new rap recordings against
approximately 800 defendants—including No Limit Films for the
sample in “Jam.”95 Bridgeport Music and Southfield Music were
involved in the music publishing business and “exploit[ed] musical
composition copyrights,” and Westbound Records and Nine Records
recorded and distributed sound recordings.96 Bridgeport Music and
Westbound Records claimed to own both the musical composition
and sound recording copyrights in “Jam.”97 There was no dispute

See infra Sections II.A.4, II.B.4.
See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005).
92 Looping is the process of playing a segment over and over. AL KOHN & BOB
KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 1596 (4th ed. 2010).
93 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 796.
94 Id. The segment appears “at 0:49, 1:52, 2:29, 3:20 and 3:46.” Id.
95 See id. at 795.
96 Id. “Bridgeport and companies like it hold portfolios of old rights
(sometimes accumulated in dubious fashion) and use lawsuits to extort money from
successful music artists for routine sampling, no matter how minimal or unnoticeable.”
Tim Wu, Jay-Z Versus the Sample Troll: The Shady One-Man Corporation That’s
Destroying Hip-Hop, SLATE (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/
culturebox/2006/11/jayz_versus_the_sample_troll.html [https://perma.cc/AH5C-4WUQ].
97 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 796.
90
91
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that a two-second sample from a guitar riff in “Jam” was digitally
sampled in the recording “100 Miles.”98
The district court granted summary judgment to No
Limit Films on Bridgeport Music’s and Westbound Records’s
infringement claim.99 It found that “a jury could reasonably
conclude” that the sample from “Jam” was entitled to copyright
protection because it was original and creative,100 but that under
either a de minimis analysis or fragmented literal similarity
test, the sampling did not reach the level of constituting an
illegal appropriation.101 The district court further noted that a
reasonable jury would not recognize the sample’s source unless
someone identified the source for them, even if the jury was
familiar with the original musician’s works.102
3. The Sixth Circuit’s Interpretation of the Copyright
Act
In 2005, Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit.103 That
court interpreted Section 114(b) as providing sound recording
owners with “the exclusive right to ‘sample’ [their] own
recording[s].”104 The court reasoned that Section 114(b) says
sound recording copyright holders’ rights “do not extend to the
making or duplication of another sound recording that consists
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even
though sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted
sound recording.”105
The court provided a number of reasons for why this
was the appropriate interpretation of the section.106 First, the
court noted that enforcement of the section is relatively simple:
“[g]et a license or do not sample.”107 Second, the court explained
98 See id. at 795–96. For a comparison of Jam and 100 Miles, see N.W.A’s
‘100 Miles and Runnin’ Sample of Funkadelic’s ‘Get Off Your Ass and Jam’, WHO
SAMPLED, http://www.whosampled.com/sample/35629/N.W.A-100-Miles-and-Runnin
%27-Funkadelic-Get-Off-Your-Ass-and-Jam/ [https://perma.cc/QC25-QT2G].
99 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830,
842–43 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
100 Id. at 839.
101 See id. at 841; see also Section I.C.
102 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 797. There were other claims discussed in the
Sixth Circuit’s decision that are not relevant to this note’s discussion. See id. Among
the claims, there was a claim regarding the issue of copyright ownership (which the
district court denied as moot), an issue involving denial of a motion to amend, and a
claim involving attorney’s fees and costs. See id.
103 See id. at 795.
104 Id. at 800–01 (emphasis added).
105 Id. at 800 (emphasis added) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012)).
106 Id. at 801.
107 Id.
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that “the market will control the license price,” and a license
fee cannot be “greater than what it would cost the person
seeking the license to just duplicate the sample in the course of
making the new recording.”108 Third, the court pointed out that
“sampling is never accidental.”109 After going through this
analysis, the court indicated that the reason why one cannot
take a couple notes from a sound recording but can take a
couple notes from a musical composition is because (1) it “is
dictated by the statute,” and (2) a small sample of a sound
recording is valuable.110 Thus, aside from examining the
statutory text, the Sixth Circuit also considered the nature of a
sound recording.111 The court reasoned that regardless of how
small a sound recording is, the part taken has value, which is
evidenced by the fact that the sampler “intentionally sampled
because it would (1) save costs, or (2) add something to the new
recordings, or (3) both.”112 The court further argued that “[i]t is
a physical taking rather than an intellectual one” because the
sounds are taken directly from a fixed medium.113
In light of its interpretation of Section 114(b), the Sixth
Circuit found that “something approximating a bright-line test”
would best serve both the music industry and the courts.114 The
court qualified this statement, noting that it should not
necessarily be a “‘one size fits all’ test, but one that, at least,
adds clarity to what constitutes actionable infringement with
regard to the digital sampling of copyrighted sound
recordings.”115 The court noted that when taking into account
the district court judge’s “hundreds of other cases all involving
different samples from different songs, the value of a principled
bright-line rule becomes apparent.”116
Having no relevant precedent to rely on,117 the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
Id.
Id.
110 See id. at 801–02.
111 Id. at 801–02.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 802.
114 Id. at 799.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 802.
117 Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that the district court in Bridgeport
“emphasized the paucity of case law on the issue of whether digital sampling amounts
to copyright infringement.” Id. at 797. The district court in Bridgeport
108
109

found the following cases involving digital music sampling: Campbell v.
Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994)
(fair use/parody defense); Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (no infringement; any original elements copied not contained in
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judgment and agreed with Westbound Records’s argument that
“no substantial similarity or de minimis inquiry should be
undertaken at all when the defendant has not disputed that it
digitally sampled a copyrighted sound recording.”118
4. Support for the Sixth Circuit Interpretation
The Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport noted that legal scholars
have suggested that the court’s interpretation of the Copyright
Act is correct.119 One author wrote ten years prior to the
decision that
it seems like the only way to infringe on a sound recording is to rerecord sounds from the original work, which is exactly the nature of
digital sound sampling. Then the only issue becomes whether the
defendant re-recorded sound from the original. This suggests that
the substantial similarity test is inapplicable to sound recordings.120

The court references a mere half dozen other scholarly articles
that might suggest its decision was correct.121
Those who view sampling as an economic threat to “the
employment of studio and concert performers” would praise the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport.122 Some even viewed the
alternative outcome as unfair—in 2011, Dean Garfield,
President and CEO of Information Technology Industry Council,
said, “The concept that . . . you could spend your entire career
developing something and because someone decides to take 75
percent of it instead of 100 percent means that you don’t have a
way of being compensated, to [him], simply sounds unfair.”123
musical composition); Williams v. Broadus, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1051 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (genuine issues of fact existed as to substantial similarity of works);
Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Management v. Profile Records, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1398
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff did not
prove copying or substantial similarity); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F.
Supp. 282) (D.N.J. 1993) (summary judgment for defendant denied where
facts existed as to substantial similarity); Grand Upright Music Ltd. v.
Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (infringement found
without any substantial similarity analysis); and Fantasy, Inc. v. La Face
Records, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1700 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (pre–1972 sound recording not
protected by Copyright Act).
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 840 n.11 (2002), rev’d,
410 F.3d 792.
118 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 798.
119 Id. at 803.
120 Id. at 801 n.13 (quoting Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling,
Copyright Law and the American Music Industry: Piracy or Just a Bad “RAP”?, 37 LOY.
L. REV. 879, 896 (1992)).
121 Id. at 798–99 n.7, 801 n.10–11, 802 n.14–15, 804 n.19.
122 McGraw, supra note 24, at 152.
123 Digital Music Sampling: Creativity or Criminality?, NPR (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/01/28/133306353/Digital-Music-Sampling-Creativity-Or-
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Courts have categorized music sampling as “the most
‘brazen stealing of music’ possible.”124 For example, in 1991, in
Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.,125 the
Second Circuit began its opinion by quoting the Bible, “Thou
shalt not steal.”126 The court rejected the defendants’ argument
that, because “stealing is rampant in the music business,” their
sampling of three words from another song’s composition should be
excused.127 The court viewed the sampling as not only a violation of
the Seventh Commandment, but also of U.S. copyright laws.128
Over twenty years later, the Sixth Circuit seemed to agree.129 Yet,
most courts did not sing to the same tune.130
B.

The Ninth Circuit Creates a Rift in VMG Salsoul, LLC v.
Ciccone

Most courts in other circuits that were presented with
this issue declined to follow the Sixth Circuit, and both the
music industry and other courts have largely seemed to
disagree with the Sixth Circuit’s assertion that a bright-line
test is in their best interest.131 The ruling in Bridgeport “led to
far more conservative sampling in the music industry,” and
“[s]eeking a license for samples, even very tiny ones, became an
industry standard.”132 Those who could not afford a license
either did not sample or did not license and risked a lawsuit.133
The Ninth Circuit resolved this dilemma for many in the music
industry by correctly finding a de minimis exception in the
Copyright Act for the unauthorized use of sound recordings. By
doing so, however, the Ninth Circuit created a new dilemma—a
circuit split.
Criminality [https://perma.cc/HU72-94UJ]. While taking 75 percent of something may
indeed be unfair, that is precisely what the de minimis defense is for—the de minimis
defense may not in fact be successful in the type of copying that Garfield describes.
124 Joshua Crum, The Day The (Digital) Music Died: Bridgeport, Sampling
Infringement, and a Proposed Middle Ground, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 943, 952–53 (2008)
(quoting Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 295 (D.N.J. 1993)).
125 Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182
(2nd Cir. 1991). The subject of the case was the unauthorized use of a composition, not
a sound recording. Id. at 183. At issue was who owned the copyright to the song’s
composition. Id.
126 Id. (quoting Exodus 20:15).
127 Id.
128 See id.
129 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 n.12 (6th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Grand Upright Music Ltd., 780 F. Supp. at 183).
130 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016).
131 See id. (collecting cases to illuminate “a deep split among the federal courts
[that] already exist[ed]” prior to VMG Salsoul (emphasis in original)); infra Section II.B.4.
132 Donahue, supra note 81.
133 See id.
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1. The Sample
The sample in the song “Vogue,” recorded by Madonna and
Shep Pettibone, is a 0.23-second segment of horns, predominantly
trombones and trumpets, from Pettibone’s recording of “Ooh I Love
It (Love Break),” referred to as “Love Break.”134 The horn hits used
in “Vogue” are not exactly as they appear in “Love Break.”135
Pettibone modified the single horn hit in “Vogue” by “isolat[ing] the
horns by filtering out the other instruments playing at the same
time,” “transpos[ing] it to a different key,” “truncate[ing] it,” and
“add[ing] effects and other sounds to the chord itself.”136 He
used the same process for the double horn hit “except that he
duplicated the single horn hit and shortened one of the
duplicates to create the eighth-note chord from the quarternote chord.”137 He also overlaid sounds from other instruments
over the resulting horn hits.138
2. The Procedural History
Defendants Madonna and Shep Pettibone recorded
“Vogue” in 1990, less than ten years after Pettibone recorded
“Love Break.”139 Plaintiff VMG Salsoul alleged that Pettibone
copied the 0.23-second segment of horns and modified it in the
recording of “Vogue.”140 During trial, the plaintiff’s primary
expert “misidentified the source of the sampled double horn
hit” in his original report.141 The district court “applied the
longstanding legal rule that ‘de minimis’ copying does not
constitute infringement.”142 The court granted summary
judgment to Defendants Madonna and Pettibone on two
alternative grounds: (1) “neither the composition nor the sound
recording of the horn hit was ‘original’ for purposes of copyright
law,” and (2) “even if the horn hit was original, any sampling of
the horn hit was ‘de minimis or trivial.’”143

134 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 876. For a comparison of “Vogue” and “Love
Break,” see Madonna’s ‘Vogue’ Sample of The Salsoul Orchestra’s Ooh, I Love It (Love
Break), WHO SAMPLED, http://www.whosampled.com/sample/26512/Madonna-VogueThe-Salsoul-Orchestra-Ooh,-I-Love-It-(Love-Break) [https://perma.cc/X85H-EPPP].
135 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 879.
136 Id. at 879–80.
137 Id. at 880.
138 See id.
139 See id. at 875.
140 See id. at 874–75.
141 Id. at 880 (emphasis in original).
142 Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
143 Id. at 876.
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3. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of the Copyright
Act
First, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that if the expert
witness, a “highly qualified and trained musician,” who “listened
to the recordings with the express aim of discerning which parts
of the song had been copied,” could not accurately identify the
sample, then a jury would not be able to do any better.144
Next, the Ninth Circuit conducted a statutory
interpretation of the Copyright Act, beginning with Section 102.145
Section 102(a)146 lists the types of works of authorship that the
Copyright Act protects,147 which include sound recordings.148 The
court noted that sound recordings are listed among other types of
works of authorship with no suggestion of “differential
treatment.”149 The court then turned to Section 106, which
provides exclusive rights in copyrighted works, and determined
that “nothing in that provision suggests differential treatment of
de minimis copying of sound recordings.”150
The court then turned its focus to Section 114(b) and
rejected the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of it.151 The court
noted that the third sentence of Section 114(b) “imposes an
express limitation on the rights of a copyright holder”152 in
stating that “[t]he exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright
in a sound recording . . . do not extend to the making or
duplication of another sound recording [with certain
qualities].”153 Although the court was hesitant to read an
expansion of rights into Congress’s express limitation on those
rights, it also hesitated to read the text as “an unstated,
implicit elimination” of the de minimis exception in light of the
“centuries of jurisprudence” on the “consistent application of

Id. at 880; see DOWD, supra note 74, at § 13:30.
See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 881.
146 Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act provides: “Copyright protection
subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Pursuant to subsection 7, works of
authorship include sound recordings. Id. at 102(a)(7).
147 It is important to note that Section 102(a) states that the Copyright Act
can protect works of authorship in mediums that are “now known or later developed.”
Id. (emphasis added); see also infra Section V.B.
148 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7).
149 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 881–82.
150 Id. at 882.
151 Id. at 884.
152 Id. at 883 (emphasis in original).
153 Id. (alterations and emphasis in original) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)).
144

145
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the de minimis exception.”154 Rather, the court found that “[a]
straightforward reading of the third sentence” indicates that
Congress did not intend for a new recording that merely
mimics a copyrighted recording to constitute infringement “so
long as there was no actual copying.”155
The Ninth Circuit dismantled the Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning in Bridgeport by showing that both Congress and the
Supreme Court indicate that the de minimis rule applies to
unauthorized sampling of sound recordings.156 First, the Ninth
Circuit noted that a “physical taking” applies to other forms of
artistic works and the court was unable to identify a copyright
case creating an exception to the de minimis rule within that
context.157 Second, the court argued that even if it accepted the
premise that sound recordings are qualitatively different from
other copyrightable works, “that theoretical difference does not
mean that Congress actually adopted a different rule.”158 Third,
the court did not view “the distinction between a ‘physical
taking’ and an ‘intellectual one,’” as advancing the Sixth
Circuit’s view.159 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the
Supreme Court has held that “the Copyright Act protects only
the expressive aspects of a copyrighted work.”160 The court,
however, reasoned that the Sixth Circuit’s argument that the
sampler has taken expressive content from the original artist is
weakened by the fact that such a taking is true regardless of the
work’s nature, and yet the de minimis test has still applied.161
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that it was creating a
circuit split162 in holding that “the ‘de minimis’ exception
applies to infringement actions concerning copyrighted sound
recordings, just as it applies to all other copyright infringement
actions.”163 The court “affirm[ed] the summary judgment
[motion] in favor of [the] [d]efendants.”164 Rejecting the
“[p]laintiff’s argument that Congress eliminated the ‘de
minimis’ exception to claims alleging infringement of a sound
recording,”165 the court agreed with the district court that “a
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

349 (1991)).
161
162
163
164
165

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 885.
Id. at 885.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 885 (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
Id.
See id. at 886.
Id. at 874; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 874.
Id.
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general audience would not recognize the brief snippet in
Vogue as originating from Love Break.”166
4. Support for the Ninth Circuit Interpretation
Many professionals in both the legal and music
industries who criticized Bridgeport applauded the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of the Copyright Act.167 The
commentators of a leading copyright treatise view the Sixth
Circuit’s interpretation as “greatly expand[ing] the scope of
copyright in a sound recording by eliminating both the
‘substantial similarity’ requirement and the de minimis rule.”168
And in light of Congress’s express “intention to limit the scope of
copyright in sound recordings” in its enactment of Section
114(b), the commentators view the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation
as proper.169 Another authority on copyright has viewed the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in VMG Salsoul—which “stands for the
somewhat unremarkable proposition that use of a single chord is
‘trivial’ and insufficient to necessitate the need to obtain a
license before the chord is used”170—as “represent[ing] a welcome
dose of sanity at a time when the entire music industry risks
devouring itself in one giant copyright lawsuit.”171 Professionals
in the music industry indeed have welcomed an exception for
trivial172 uses.173 For example, prior to the Ninth Circuit decision,
Hank Shocklee, “the co-founder and producer of the [hip hop]
group Public Enemy and president of Shocklee Entertainment,”
believed that “the original copyrights were there to protect the

166 Id. The Ninth Circuit separately found that there was no infringement on the
composition copyright. See id. at 878–79. Looking to Newton v. Diamond as its “leading
authority on actual copying,” the Ninth Circuit found that to establish an actionable
copyright infringement claim, the copying must be substantial. Id. at 877 (citing Newton
v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004)). In other words, “the copying [must be] greater
than de minimis.” Id. The Ninth Circuit applied this rule in VMG Salsoul, “conclud[ing]
that a reasonable juror could not conclude that an average audience would recognize the
appropriation of the horn hit.” Id. at 880 (emphasis in original).
167 See ABRAMS, supra note 41, at § 14:46.3; Donahue, supra note 81.
168 See ABRAMS, supra note 41, at § 14:46.3.
169 Id. (emphasis in original).
170 Erin E. Rhinehart, Madonna Doesn’t Need a License to “Vogue,” 2 TYL IN
FOCUS: POPLAW 30 (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
young_lawyer/special_issues/ABA_TYL_In_Focus_PopLaw_v002n04_issue.authcheck
dam.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EEF-6Y3W].
171 Jeff John Roberts, Madonna’s Copyright Win Is Good News for Fans and
Musicians, FORTUNE (June 6, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/06/madonna-copyright/
[https://perma.cc/GC6F-67SU].
172 Rhinehart, supra note 170, at 30.
173 Digital Music Sampling: Creativity or Criminality?, supra note 123.
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entire embodiment of the recording itself, . . . not necessarily the
little pieces that [were] coming from it.”174
Other courts have also supported the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation.175 Even before the Ninth Circuit decided VMG
Salsoul, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida criticized the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Bridgeport under the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in a copyright
infringement case involving a musical composition.176 In
Saragema India Ltd. v. Mosley, the district court noted that the
Eleventh Circuit had previously “impose[d] a ‘substantial
similarity’ requirement as a constituent element of all
infringement claims.”177 The district court in Saragema critiqued
the Sixth Circuit’s reading of Section 114(b).178 The court said:
First, Section 114(b)’s derivative-work provision addresses the scope
of protection given to derivative works, not original works. There is
no indication that Congress sought to expand the scope of protection
for original works by redefining the term “derivative work” to
include all works containing any sound from the original sound
recording, whether those works bear substantial similarities to the
original work or not . . . . Second, the Bridgeport court’s reading of
Section 114(b)’s similar-sounding work provision is more expansive
than its text and legislative history suggest . . . . [A] more plausible
reading of this provision is that protection in a copyrighted sound
recording “do[es] not extend” to sound recordings which, although
similar-sounding, do not capture any sounds from the copyrighted
sound recording.179

The district court in Saragema concluded that Section 114(b)’s
language and legislative history do not indicate that the
“provision relates to works which are not similar-sounding or
that Congress otherwise sought to abandon the substantial
similarity inquiry.”180
Courts in other countries have also recognized a de
minimis exception in their own jurisdictions.181 Germany’s
Constitutional Court ruled that an artist was able to use a
looped sample from a two-second recording of another artist’s
Id. Shocklee views sampling as an art form. Id.
See Saragema India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–41 (S.D.
Fla. 2009), aff’d. 635 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2011).
176 Id. The district court held the allegedly infringing recording and the
original song were not substantially similar. Id. at 1327.
177 Id. at 1339 (emphasis in original) (citing Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212
F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000)).
178 See id. at 1340.
179 Id. at 1341 (emphasis in original).
180 Id. (footnote omitted).
181 See Luke Hill, Songs and Samples, LEXOLOGY (June 16, 2016), http://
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=16eff294-4a10-4871-9f4d-50806c35309b [https://
perma.cc/S9KU-ZG9D].
174

175
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song.182 The Federal Court of Justice had stated that the use of
“‘even a tiny sliver’” would be an infringement, but the
Constitutional Court noted that certain types of music rely on
sampling and that recreating a sound can be “too costly and
time consuming to be practical.”183 Thus, there is both national
and international support for a de minimis exception in this
area of law.
III.

“BLURRED LINES”184: IMPACT OF THE SPLIT

There are now different levels of protection for
musicians across the country. The future of music sampling,
and thus musical creativity, is perhaps more unclear than ever
before in light of the circuit split. This Part describes why it is
crucial to resolve the debate on sampling by detailing the
effects the rift has on the dilemma between licensing and
litigating and the implication that has for creativity.
A.

Why Different Levels of Protection for Musicians is
Problematic

While in the twenty-first century an alleged
infringement would be nationwide, the protections afforded
musicians vary circuit by circuit.185 Disparate law can lead to
forum shopping,186 especially since “the increasingly national
nature of the recording industry renders virtually every venue
subject to a potential suit against a major arm of the music
industry.”187 For example, it is reasonable to believe that the
Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Bridgeport prompted the party suing
Justin Bieber over his song, “Sorry,” to file in Tennessee, which
is bound by the ruling.188 That the Sixth and Ninth Circuits are
See id.
Id.
184 ROBIN THICKE, BLURRED LINES (Star Trak Entertainment 2013).
185 Anna Miller, Is Music Sampling Bank En Vogue?, LEXOLOGY: THE TMCA
(July 12, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dcaed9bf-4fa4-48d0-8a
23-28ffac026281 [https://perma.cc/YP95-RQX9].
186 See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1677–
78 (1990) (noting that forum shopping is considered to be an “unethical and
inefficient” practice).
187 Eric M. Leventhal, Would You Want William Hung as Your Trier of Fact?
The Case for a Specialized Musicology Tribunal, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1557, 1580 & n.159
(2012) (citing and quoting Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a
Specialized Copyright Court: Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L. J. 717, 723 (1999)) (“[T]he potential explosion of jurisdictional
possibilities makes more poignant the need for a more uniform, nationwide
interpretation of the laws on copyright.”).
188 Roberts, supra note 171.
182
183
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responsible for the split is important in and of itself—the Ninth
Circuit includes California courts and the Sixth Circuit
includes Tennessee courts.189 Thus, different rules now govern
the major music recording hubs of the country—Los Angeles,
Nashville, and Memphis.190 Many people and companies in the
music industry have ties to both Tennessee and California, as
the parties did in Justin Bieber’s case,191 and can therefore
forum shop between the two states in the hopes of achieving
their desired outcome. With the pervasiveness of music
sampling in today’s industry, as evidenced by the 800
defendants in Bridgeport alone,192 forum shopping is bound to
continue unrestrained so long as the split remains unresolved.
B.

Future of Music Sampling

Without a resolution of the split, the future of music
sampling remains murky. Those in jurisdictions governed by
the Sixth Circuit will continue to either obtain a license, not
engage in the unauthorized sampling of copyrighted sound
recordings, or sample copyrighted sound recordings without a
license and risk litigation. As the Sixth Circuit posited in
Bridgeport, “it would appear to be cheaper to license than to
litigate.”193 Others have shared this view, believing that “in the
litigious environment of the United States, there is nothing to
be gained and much money potentially to be lost by being a
renegade.”194 In light of the Ninth Circuit decision in VMG
Salsoul, however, music samplers may increasingly take the
risk of litigation “due to the increased viability of the de
minimis exception” within the Ninth Circuit.195 Many may view
the risk of litigation as outweighing the transaction costs
189 See FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION, About U.S. Federal Courts, http://
www.fedbar.org/Public-Messaging/About-US-Federal-Courts_1.aspx [https://perma.cc/P6
KN-E8DA].
190 Nashville, Tennessee is the self-described “Songwriting Capital of the
World.” VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 n.1 (6th Cir. 2016)
(Silverman, J., dissenting) (quoting The Story of Music City, NASHVILLE CONVENTION
& VISITORS CORP., http://visitmusiccity.com/visitors/aboutmusiccity/storyofmusiccity
[https://perma.cc/E3AD-U45B]).
191 See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1–3, Dienel v. WarnerTamerlane, No. 3:16-cv-00978 (M.D. Tenn. filed May 25, 2016).
192 See Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2005).
193 Id. at 802 (footnote omitted).
194 David Sanjek, “Don’t Have to DJ No More”: Sampling and the
“Autonomous” Creator, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 607, 621 (1992).
195 Tamany Vinson Bentz & Matthew J. Busch, VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Madonna
Louise Ciccone, et al.: Why a Bright Line Infringement Rule for Sound Recordings is no
Longer in Vogue, LEXOLOGY (June 28, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?
g=cb00162a-3c71-4853-9b0f-4f6cb644f556 [https://perma.cc/4RN2-Q2ZX].
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associated with obtaining a license.196 While litigating may be
the hot approach to take for samplees in the Sixth Circuit and
for samplers in the Ninth Circuit, the split may result in a
chilling effect on sampling in other jurisdictions, where other
circuit courts have not reviewed the issue, because potential
samplers may want to avoid any risk.197
A chilling effect on sampling means a chilling effect on
creativity. Sampling itself has become an art—an art that has
given rise to hit songs that have out-charted the songs they
sampled.198 Those who favor the Sixth Circuit’s stance may
view this as a reason to prohibit the unauthorized use of music
sampling because it allows the sampler to surpass the samplee.
This phenomena, however, can be used to support music
sampling. Songs that out-chart the ones they sampled indicate
that music sampling not only revives songs of the past, it gives
them new life and contributes to the evolution of music.
Keep in mind that this note does not argue that an
artist can sample any length portion of another artist’s song
without obtaining a license. Rather, this note’s argument is
more de minimis than that. If an artist has an ear for a new
beat that utilizes a miniscule portion of a guitar riff from
another artist’s song, the artist should be able to sample that
riff without going through the costly process of obtaining a
license, recreating the sound in a studio, or litigating. By
having the freedom to sample de minimis portions of another
artist’s song, artists can continue to revive old songs and
contribute to the evolution of certain genres of music—
especially hip hop and rap. Eliminating the de minimis
196 Entertainment lawyer Dina Lapolt said there are “two types of samples:
the really fucking expensive type, and the really, really fucking expensive type.” See
MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 158; Dina LaPolt, LAPOLT LAW, http://
lapoltlaw.com/attorneys-staff/dina-lapolt/ [https://perma.cc/KGX3-HUDQ].
197 As discussed in Part II, there was a paucity of case law on the issue when
the Sixth Circuit decided Bridgeport, and the Ninth Circuit has been the only other
circuit court to review the issue since the Sixth Circuit’s decision. See supra Sections
II.A–B. Although a majority of authorities have seemed to favor the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation, samplers outside of the Ninth Circuit may refrain from sampling—if
unable to afford the cost of licensing for such de minimis recordings—out of fear that
another circuit court will side with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation. See supra Part II.
One sample clearance expert noticed that “there is very little sampling going on
anymore because it has now become so exorbitantly expensive to do so.” MCLEOD &
DICOLA, supra note 21, at 159.
198 See Gary Trust, Ask Billboard: What Hits Have Out-Charted the Songs they
Sample?, BILLBOARD (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chartbeat/6039674/ask-billboard-what-hits-have-out-charted-the-songs-they-sample [https://
perma.cc/JJ3C-NATP]. Hit songs that have out-chartered the songs they sampled
include “Ice Ice Baby” by Vanilla Ice (sampled “Under Pressure” by Queen and David
Bowie), “U Can’t Touch This” by M.C. Hammer (sampled “Superfreak” by Rick James),
and “SOS” by Rihanna (sampled “Tainted Love” by Soft Cell). See id.
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exception, on the other hand, can effectively chill the evolution
of these genres and would leave it to only those who have the
money to advance these genres through sampling. Until there
is a resolution of the circuit split, the divide between the
circuits that are home to the music capitals of the world will
continue to either lead to forum shopping or a chilling effect on
the creative practice of sampling.
IV.

“UNDER PRESSURE”199: WHY THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD RESOLVE THE SPLIT

Members of the music industry, commentators, and
those in the legal field have interpreted the Copyright Act in
various ways and have advocated for different solutions to the
issue of whether the Copyright Act allows for a de minimis
exception for the unauthorized use of copyrighted sound
recordings.200 Although some disagree as to the likelihood of
congressional action or a Supreme Court decision resolving the
issue, many acknowledge that these are the two main ways in
which this issue can be resolved.201 This author concludes that
a Supreme Court decision is needed to resolve the rift.
A.

Congressional Solution

The Sixth Circuit said that if its interpretation of the
Act was not what Congress intended, then the record industry
could look to Congress for “clarification or a change in the
law”—if that was the case, the Sixth Circuit believed Congress
199 QUEEN & DAVID BOWIE, UNDER PRESSURE (EMI Music Publishing Ltd.
1981). Under Pressure was sampled in “Ice Ice Baby.” Dan Epstein, ‘Cool as Ice’: The
Story Behind Vanilla Ice’s Career-Killing Movie, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 18, 2016), http://
www.rollingstone.com/movies/news/cool-as-ice-the-story-behind-vanilla-ices-doomedmovie-w444728 [https://perma.cc/J794-HS3Y].
200 Many view the plain language of the Copyright Act as prohibiting any
sampling of sound recordings unless it is the copyright holder who is doing the
sampling but do not advocate for a bright-line rule as the Sixth Circuit did in
Bridgeport. See Carl Eppler, These Are the Breaks: Applying the Newton test in a New
Context to Provide Protection for Rhythmic Material in Musical Works, 42 U. MEM. L.
REV. 413, 430 (2011). Eppler concludes that Newton’s substantial similarity test is the
best alternative to bright-line rules. Id. at 456. Others advocate for the courts to create
an entirely new test to determine what constitutes copyright infringement such as a
test based on economic factors. See Blessing, supra note 28, at 2423.
201 Lesley M. Grossberg, A Circuit Split at Last: Ninth Circuit Recognizes De
Minimis Exception to Copyright Infringement of Sound Recordings, LEXOLOGY:
COPYRIGHT, CONTENT, AND PLATFORMS (June 21, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=02f96741-68b8-4883-bc80-8b5b649d51c6 [https://perma.cc/3KRKEJPD] (“While congressional action or a Supreme Court decision could resolve this
split, neither seems particularly likely, at least for the foreseeable future,
notwithstanding the prevalence of the act of sampling in the music industry.”).
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was better suited to solve this issue.202 Practitioners have
surmised that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in VMG Salsoul
“could pave the way for reform of the licensing regime for
digital samples that took root after Bridgeport,” which can
come in the form of a congressional change of the copyright
laws.203 In 2012, one author proposed a legislative change and
suggested treating sampling, of both musical compositions and
sound recordings, as a fair use so long as the sample is not
sufficiently substantial.204 The author noted, however, that a
legislative change implementing a new scheme “can be a time
consuming and lengthy process.”205
Of even greater concern, as public choice theory can
explain, is that a congressional change is subject to capture and
control by the music industry.206
Public choice theory posits that groups have the incentive to lobby
for passage of legislation that will confer concentrated benefits on
the group. So long as the costs the legislation imposes on others are
dispersed, opponents will have less incentive to oppose the
legislation. As a result, legal rules can be expected to favor the
interests of well-organized and politically influential interest groups
at the expense of more diffuse groups.207

Under this theory, if the issue is left to Congress to resolve, the
most well-organized and politically influential interest groups
within the music industry may lobby enough to have Congress
alter the language of Section 114(b) to read how they want it
to. While the majority of authorities favor a de minimis
exception, as evidenced by the criticism of Bridgeport and the
praise for VMG Salsoul, a Congressional change does not
preclude the possibility of Bridgeport supporters prevailing.208
Since the “intellectual property industries have framed what are
essentially technological threats to their interests in the high
moral language of truly grievous wrongs,” such as theft and
piracy, those who are against the de minimis exception may
successfully lobby Congress with this framing mechanism.209
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005).
Bentz & Busch, supra note 195.
204 See Pelletier, supra note 54, at 1194; see also supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
205 Id. at 1198.
206 See Clarissa Long, The Political Economy of Trademark Dilution, in
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 137
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008).
207 Id. (footnote omitted).
208 See supra Sections II.A.4, II.B.4.
209 Samuel Murumba, Foxes and Hedgehogs at the Intersection of Human
Rights and Intellectual Property, 38 MONASH U. L. REV. 119, 128 (2012).
202

203
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In 2011, Professor Kembrew McLeod, a leading expert
in copyright,210 appeared to favor a congressional change in
saying, “I think we need to revisit . . . what Congress did a
hundred years ago when they rethought copyright law
and . . . basically enabled the 20th century music industry to
exist because the music industry was based largely on cover
songs.”211 He changed his tune, however, after the Ninth Circuit
decision and suggested that the Supreme Court would need to
review the issue to achieve clarity.212
B.

Judicial Solution

A judicial solution could come from the courts in one of
two ways: (1) other circuits can follow the Ninth Circuit and
reject the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport so that it
becomes “something of an aberration,” or (2) the Supreme
Court, responding to the circuit split, can “offer clear,
nationwide guidance on how copyright law should cover
sampling.”213 Although McLeod originally discussed the
possibility of Congress changing the language of Section 114(b)
to clarify its meaning and perhaps impose “a quantitative
threshold for de minimis use” of sound recordings,214 after the
circuit split he said, “If there’s ever going [to] be any real
clarity, the Supreme Court needs to review the issue.”215
C.

Recommendation

A judicial resolution of the circuit split, specifically in
the form of a Supreme Court ruling for nationwide clarity,
could quickly and clearly resolve the issue rather than a
congressional change that could lead to further confusion after
years of lobbying by the music industry. The Supreme Court,
unlike Congress, is not subject to the pressures of the music
industry and many of its members’ “rhetorical moralising.”216
Furthermore, Congress “lacks the capacity, time, and
expertise” in this area to get the solution “just right.”217
MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21.
Digital Music Sampling: Creativity or Criminality?, supra note 123.
212 See Donahue, supra note 81.
213 Id.
214 See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 233.
215 Donahue, supra note 81.
216 Murumba, supra note 209 (“Intellectual property industries have framed
what are essentially technological threats to their interests in high moral language of
truly grievous wrongs: theft, piracy, and even serial murder.”); see also Long, supra
note 206, at 146–47.
217 MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 217.
210

211
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Although the Supreme Court may not have expertise in
copyright policy specifically, the Court has expertise in statutory
interpretation. Thus, the Supreme Court is best suited to resolve
this split so that professionals in the music industry are clearly
allowed the same scope of creativity regardless of where in the
country they choose to create their music.
V.

“STAIRWAY TO [THE SOLUTION]”218: A STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT

This Part sets forth a statutory interpretation approach
that the Supreme Court should use to clarify that Section
114(b) allows for a de minimis exception for the unauthorized
use of sound recordings. There is no single method to conduct
statutory interpretation; however, popular canons of
construction that have been codified in many jurisdictions
include an examination of the plain or literal meaning of the
statue, the enactment history, and the statutory structure—all
of which the Ninth Circuit examined in VMG Salsoul.219 The
statutory interpretation analysis conducted in the following
Sections is similar to that conducted by the Ninth Circuit but
with an express focus on the purpose of copyright law and an
examination of the jurisprudence in this area of law. The
Supreme Court should conduct the statutory interpretation
analysis set forth below to resolve the split and to provide the
music industry with clear parameters of the Copyright Act.
A.

Plain Meaning

The Sixth Circuit asserted it took a “‘literal reading’
approach” to analyzing the Copyright Act in Bridgeport.220 But
the court erred in its “literal” reading of the Copyright Act. In
fact, the plain meaning of Section 114(b) does not even address
the issue of whether parts of a sound recording can be sampled
without authorization.
The first two sentences of Section 114(b) of the
Copyright Act read:
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording
under clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the
LED ZEPPELIN, STAIRWAY TO HEAVEN (Atlantic 1972).
See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 881–86 (9th Cir. 2016); see
generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO.
L. J. 341 (2010) (detailing the “prevailing theories of statutory interpretation in the
context of the widespread codification of canons”).
220 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005).
218

219
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sound recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or
indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording. The
exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative
work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are
rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality.221

These first two sentences limit the scope of copyright protection
in sound recordings.222 They do not expand it in any way—and
they certainly do not expand copyright protection in a way that
eliminates the possibility of a de minimis exception for the
unauthorized use of sound recordings. Simply put, there is no
mention of a de minimis exception, but the first two sentences
of Section 114(b) do not preclude the existence of an exception
either. The Ninth Circuit in VMG Salsoul, however, only
focused on the third sentence as imposing an express limitation
on a copyright holder’s rights.223
The third sentence of Section 114(b) of the Copyright
Act reads:
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording
under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making
or duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds
imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.224

This sentence “validat[es] entire sound-alike recordings.”225 In
other words, a copyright owner’s rights in his or her sound
recording do not protect the owner from another person
imitating the entire sound recording.226 The word “entirely”
does not indicate that the copyright owner has the exclusive
right to sample his or her own recording, as the Sixth Circuit
determined.227 The Ninth Circuit, however, merely rejected the
Sixth Circuit’s interpretation without explaining the Sixth
Circuit’s misinterpretation and misplaced emphasis on the
221 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012) (emphasis added). As explained earlier in this
note, Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides for “exclusive rights in copyrighted
works,” and pursuant to its first two clauses, copyright owners have the exclusive right
to “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords” and “to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” Id. § 106. A “derivative work” is
“based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” Id. § 101. It can
consist “of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which,
as a whole, represent an original work of authorship.” Id.
222 ABRAMS, supra note 41, at § 14:46.3.
223 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883.
224 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
225 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, at § 13.03[A][2][b].
226 See id.
227 See supra Section II.A.3.
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word “entirely.”228 The Ninth Circuit should have explicitly
addressed the Sixth Circuit’s error and emphasized the fact
that the third sentence simply does not even address digital
sampling let alone the existence of a de minimis exception.229
While Section 114(b) “distinguishes between a digital
reproduction and a recreation from scratch,”230 it does not
indicate whether digital reproduction, or exact copying, of de
minimis parts of sound recordings is permissible.231 There is
“no implication that partial sound duplications are to be
treated any differently from what is required by the traditional
standards of copyright law—which, for decades prior to
adoption of the 1976 Act and unceasingly in the decades since,
has included the requirement of substantial similarity.”232
The Copyright Act does allow for a de minimis
exception, but as this Section has suggested, an analysis of the
plain meaning of Section 114(b) is of little utility. Section
114(b) merely narrows the scope of copyright protection for
sound recordings, without specifically providing for a de
minimis exception.233 Although it is enough that the plain
meaning of the Act does not even address whether there is a de
minimis exception let alone preclude it, the Ninth Circuit
focused part of its analysis on responding to the Sixth Circuit’s
argument regarding the nature of a sound recording.234 As the
Ninth Circuit put it, however, the “theoretical difference”
between sound recordings and other types of copyrighted works
“does not mean that Congress actually adopted a different
rule.”235 The Ninth Circuit could have been more direct in
228 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884. See supra Sections II.A.3, II.B.3. Bridgeport
can be viewed as emphasizing that “handmade recreations are privileged while
mechanical reproductions are not.” Joseph P. Fishman, The Copy Process, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 855, 876 (2016).
229 The Ninth Circuit in VMG Salsoul did say that the third sentence did not
address “whether Congress intended to eliminate the longstanding de minimis
exception for sound recordings in all circumstances.” VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883.
The court, however, later went on to quote the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Section
114(b)’s third sentence without fully addressing the Sixth Circuit’s flawed
interpretation, thereby taking away the focus from the simple fact that there is no
mention of the de minimis exception in the third sentence. Id. at 884.
230 Fishman, supra note 228, at 900.
231 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
232 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, at § 13.03[A][2][b]. See Saragema India
Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d. 635 F.3d 1284 (11th
Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation
creates “in essence a new right, the right to claim copyright protection in what
standing by itself would not be copyrightable.” 4 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL
LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBL. & THE ACTS § 9:9 cmt. (3d ed. 2016).
233 See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 233.
234 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885.
235 Id.
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simply emphasizing the fact that Section 114(b) makes no
mention of a de minimis exception. Statutory interpretation,
however, is not futile. An examination of the enactment history,
statutory structure, and jurisprudence indicate more explicitly
that the Copyright Act allows for this exception to apply to the
unauthorized use of copyrighted sound recordings.236
B.

Enactment History

Since digital sampling was not a practice in the 1970s,
the Sixth Circuit posited that the legislative history of the
Copyright Act was of little utility in interpreting the Act.237 The
enactment history,238 however, explicitly indicates that the
principle of substantiality applies to Section 114(b):
“infringement takes place whenever all or any substantial
portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted
sound recording are reproduced.”239 Thus, although the Sixth
Circuit in Bridgeport chose to ignore the legislative history and
did not consider the enactment history on the grounds that
“digital sampling wasn’t being done in 1971,”240 Congress
clearly maintained the substantial similarity doctrine and
thus, the de minimis exception.
Additionally, Congress had the foresight to provide for
future technological developments in the area of copyright.241
Section 102 of the Copyright Act explicitly states that
“[c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed.”242 Thus, even if
digital sampling was not being done in the early 1970s as the
Sixth Circuit asserted,243 Congress allowed for the Copyright
See infra Sections V.B–D.
See Bridgeport, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005).
238 Enactment history is a less controversial canon of construction than
legislative history. See Lawrence M. Solan, Is it Time for a Restatement of Statutory
Interpretation?, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 733, 734, 744 (2014) (explaining that there is
disagreement over the use of legislative history, but less controversy over the use of
other canons of construction, including enactment history). Enactment history reflects
the history of changes from one iteration of an act to the next, while legislative history
includes reports of floor debates and committee reports. See James J. Brudney, Canon
Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199,
1201 (2010); id. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits do not distinguish between legislative
history and enactment history in Bridgeport and VMG Salsoul respectively. The focus
of this portion of the statutory interpretation is enactment history.
239 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 106 (1976) (emphasis added).
240 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805.
241 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
242 Id. (emphasis added).
243 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805.
236
237
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Act to cover this type of process.244 Because Congress made it
clear that the Act can adapt to technological changes, there is
no need to go through the long process of legislative change to
reword the Act so that it explicitly allows for a de minimis
exception for the unauthorized use of sound recordings.
Furthermore, even without this explicit enactment history,
the Sixth Circuit could have relied on the Supreme Court’s
decision in the 1991 case Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele.
Serv. Co., in which the Court included “copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original” as part of the elements
of copyright infringement.245
Above all, both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits failed to
focus on an important aspect of the Act’s history—the
Constitution’s Copyright Clause.246 The framers included the
Copyright Clause in the nation’s Constitution to protect
creativity, and subsequent lawmakers formulated copyright
laws to balance the interest in protecting original works with
the interest against stifling creativity pursuant to the clause.247
A de minimis exception for the unauthorized use of sound
recordings reflects the balance that the nation’s founders
sought to strike by allowing artists to continue to sample while
substantially protecting artists’ original works.
C.

Statutory Structure

An examination of the statutory structure further
supports the conclusion that Section 114(b) allows for a de
minimis exception.248 As David Nimmer—author of a leading
treatise on copyright law—points out, the rights of copyright
owners enumerated in Section 106249 are subject to limitations
imposed on those rights by subsequent sections.250 Section 114
“has carved out some exceptions to the rights that the
copyright owners of sound recordings would otherwise have
had pursuant to Section 106.”251 Every right that Section 106
grants “has always been subject to a substantial similarity
analysis.”252 Thus, as Nimmer opines, “it defies precedent for
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); SAMUELS, supra note 28, at 127.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
246 See supra Section I.A.
247 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; Blessing, supra note 28, at 2406.
248 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, at § 13.03[A][2][b].
249 See id.
250 Id. Sections 107 through the end of Chapter 1 of the Copyright Act impose
limitations on the rights set forth in Section 106. Id.
251 SCHULENBERG, supra note 2, at 510.
252 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, at § 13:03[A][2][b].
244
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Bridgeport Music to blithely discard that requirement.”253
Nimmer further notes that:
when one reflects that Section 114 imposes a limitation on the rights
granted copyright holders by Section 106, it becomes even less
comprehensible how the court could interpret Section 114 to expand
the rights enjoyed by proprietors, such that they do not need to
demonstrate substantial similarity between defendant’s purportedly
infringing production and their own copyrighted works.254

Furthermore, precluding a de minimis exception for sound
recordings has “broad consequences” affecting more than just
sound recordings—without a de minimis exception for sound
recordings, “the de minimis rule for musical compositions
becomes less meaningful for samplers, because most samples
infringe both the sound recording and the musical composition
copyrights in the sampled song.”255
D.

Jurisprudence

Courts have applied the de minimis doctrine for
centuries across all areas of law.256 Thus, as the Ninth Circuit
cautioned in VMG Salsoul, “we [should be] particularly
hesitant to read the statutory text as an unstated, implicit
elimination of that steadfast rule.”257 The Sixth Circuit’s brightline rule in Bridgeport was “at odds with the balance of
jurisprudence” on substantial similarity in the copyright
realm.258 In light of jurisprudence in this area of law, one
commentator said that the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Bridgeport was “a stain on copyright jurisprudence,”259 which is
why “no court outside of the Sixth Circuit has adopted it.”260
What the Ninth Circuit failed to acknowledge was that
a de minimis standard is more difficult to apply than a brightline rule and can lead to disparate treatment even if it is
applied across all jurisdictions. In light of the jurisprudence on
Id.
Id.
255 MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 21, at 233–34 (2011).
256 See Andrew Inest, A Theory of De Minimis and a Proposal for Its
Application in Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 946, 948 (2006).
257 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 842 F.3d 871, 883 (9th Cir. 2016).
258 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, at § 13:03[A][2][b].
259 Donahue, supra note 81. “I can’t impress upon you how poorly Bridgeport
was decided, and I think most copyright lawyers who don’t have a dog in the fight
would agree.” Id. (statement of “Paul M. Fakler, a partner with Arent Fox who
specializes in music law”).
260 Robert Brauneis, Musical Work Copyright for the Era of Digital Sound
Technology: Looking Beyond Composition and Performance, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 1, 56 (2014).
253
254
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the de minimis exception in both the legal field generally and
in the area of copyright law in particular, however, those in
and out of the music industry would be better off with a de
minimis standard than a bright-line rule against unauthorized
sampling. Bright-line rules should not be imposed just for the
sake of ease of enforcement. Not to mention, the Copyright Act
does allow for a de minimis exception for the unauthorized use
of copyrighted sound recordings.261
E.

Recommendation

In contrast to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation, this
note’s “literal reading”262 of the Copyright Act and examination
of the enactment history and relevant jurisprudence indicate
that a de minimis exception is available for sound recordings.
Rather than leaving it up to the music industry to lobby
Congress for a legislative change, the Supreme Court should
clarify Section 114(b) in its present form. Although some may
argue that it is dated and cannot keep up with technological
changes,263 the Copyright Act can be viewed as a living
document, similar to the U.S. Constitution. This is evidenced
by Section 102 of the Copyright Act stating that it applied to
“works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed.”264 The principles the
Act contains still hold true, and the doctrine of de minimis non
curat lex underlies all legal principles.
A resolution of the circuit split should come in the form
of a judicial ruling, specifically from the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court should conduct a statutory interpretation
analysis similar to the one conducted in this Part of the note.
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court should conduct
an analysis that is more focused on the simple fact that Section
114(b) does not even address de minimis sound sampling and
that is more focused on the original legislative intent behind
the Copyright Act as a whole, as prescribed by the
Constitution’s Copyright Clause. By doing so, the Supreme
Court should make it abundantly clear that the Copyright Act
in its current form provides a de minimis exception for the
unauthorized use of sound recordings.
See supra Sections V.A–C.
Bridgeport, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005).
263 See Kyle Wiens, The End of Ownership: Why You Need to Fight America’s
Copyright Laws, WIRED (Jan. 17, 2014) https://www.wired.com/2014/01/174071/
[https://perma.cc/N3Z6-AUR7].
264 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
261
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CONCLUSION
In light of the significance of the circuit split the Ninth
Circuit created in the summer of 2016, it is important that the
Supreme Court interpret the language of the Copyright Act to
allow for a de minimis exception to unauthorized digital
sampling. It has been said that “poetry can only be made out of
other poems; novels out of other novels,” and perhaps the same
holds true of music.265 Music sampling has become increasingly
more popular with advances in technology,266 and so long as
sampling is de minimis, it should not constitute copyright
infringement. The alternative—a bright-line rule against
unauthorized music sampling—would stifle creativity in the
music industry. While a bright-line rule is easier to apply than
a standard, courts should not, just for the sake of ease, read a
bright-line rule into a law that is already fluid enough to allow
a de minimis exception.
Without a resolution of the circuit split on the issue of
whether the Copyright Act allows for a de minimis exception
for the unauthorized use of copyrighted sound recordings,
many would-be music samplers may feel stifled by the Sixth
Circuit’s decision, while other music samplers may shop around
to circuits such as the Ninth in the hope of receiving a
favorable decision. Awaiting a congressional change to the
Copyright Act, aside from seeming unnecessary in light of this
note’s statutory interpretation of the Act in its present form,
could take years. It took over one hundred years for music to be
protected,267 it should not take years more for a change that can
more clearly and more quickly come from a Supreme Court
interpretation. A thorough statutory interpretation approach,
which would include an analysis of Section 114(b) in the
context of Sections 102 and 106, along with an analysis of both
the enactment history and relevant jurisprudence would make
it abundantly clear that the Copyright Act allows for a de
minimis exception for the unauthorized use of copyrighted
sound recordings.
Thus, if the opportunity arises, which it very likely will,268
the Supreme Court should sing to the well-known tune of the
265 MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 2
(1993). This quote is attributed to Northrop Frye, a Canadian literary critic. Id.
266 See Tracy L. Reilly, Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling:
An Endorsement of the Bridgeport Music Court’s Attempt to Afford “Sound” Copyright
Protection to Sound Recordings, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 361 (2008).
267 See Schietinger, supra note 24, at 216; see also SAMUELS, supra note 28, at 31.
268 Although people differ as to the likelihood of the Supreme Court deciding
this issue, at least in the near future, many acknowledge that in light of the circuit
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legal maxim, de minimis non curat lex, and find that the
Copyright Act of 1976, as it is written, allows for a de minimis
exception. Simply put, the law does not concern itself with trifles.
Elyssa E. Abuhoff †

split, a Supreme Court decision on this issue is feasible. Miller, supra note 185; Robert
J. Bernstein & Robert W. Clarida, Circuit Split Creates Uncertainty in Sampling of
Sound Recordings, THE NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (June 15, 2016), http://www.newyork
lawjournal.com/id=1202760031646/Circuit-Split-Creates-Uncertainty-in-Sampling-ofSound-Recordings?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL [https://perma.cc/8SV9-E67G];
Bentz & Busch, supra note 195; Ira S. Sacks & Julia R. Lissner, Ninth Circuit “Strikes
a Pose” For Madonna and Music Sampling in “Vogue” Copyright Dispute, LEXOLOGY:
MARKS, WORKS & SECRETS (June 7, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?
g=0bc4a678-2f8e-448e-9df6-c62887628b5e [https://perma.cc/VA6J-XC42]; see also supra
Part IV.
† J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2018; B.A. University of Delaware,
2015. Thank you to Anne Conroy, Charles Wood, Joseph Santiago, Brooke Verdiglione,
Marissa Potts, Jaimie Fitzgerald and the entire Brooklyn Law Review team for their
help and hard work on this note and publication. Thank you to Professor Samuel
Murumba and Professor Lawrence Solan for lending their expertise, along with my
college mentor, Professor Phillip Mink, who helped shape me into the legal and
creative writer I am today. Thank you to the rest of my incredible support system of
family, friends, and mentors—you all know who you are, and I appreciate each of you.
Finally, a special thanks to my parents, Gayle and Richard, for their endless love and
support—my love and gratitude for you is anything but de minimis.

